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Birth: Civil Rights and the
Twins at Birth:
Role of the Solicitor
Role
Solicitor General
SETH
P. WAXMAN*
SETHP.
WAXMAN"

It is painful even today to contemplate
contemplate the awful devastation wreaked upon this
nation by the War Between the States. But like most cataclysms,
cataclysms, the Civil War also
gave birth to some important
important positive developments. I would like to talk with you
today about
abouttwo
ofthat
two such offspring of
that war, and the extentto which, like many sibling
pairs, they have influenced
influenced each
each other's
other's development.
The first child-the
child-the most well-known
well-known progeny of the Civil War-was this
country's commitment
commitment to civil rights. The war, of course, ended slavery. But it did
not-and
not-and could
could not--change
not-(;hange the way Americans
Americans thought about and treated each
other. Civil rights and their polestar, the principle
principle of equal protection of the laws,
state-sanctioned servitude.
encompass far more than the absence
absence of state-sanctioned
servitude. The Congresses
and Presidents that served in the wake
wake of the Civil War aimed at this more
fundamental
fundamental and difficult
difficult goal. They brought about
about ratification of the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth,
laws designed
designed
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. And they enacted a variety
variety of
oflaws
to enforce the guarantees
guarantees of those Amendments.
Amendments.
But as history shows so agonizingly, it takes much more than well-meaning
laws--or even
laws-or
even constitutional amendments-to
amendments-to reweave the social
social fabric of a nation.
In the first place, a law that is merely on the books is quite different from one that is
necessarily even
actually enforced.
enforced. And what is more, a law that is enacted
enacted will not necessarily
remain on the books. Under
established in Marbury
Under the principle ofjudicial
ofjudicial review established
Marbury
v. Madison,
Madison, 1 the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the meaning of the Constitution,
the interpretation of federal statutes, and the validity of those statutes under the
Constitution. Congress can pass laws, but unless those laws are enforced, they have
challenged in the
little meaning in people's lives. And unless they are upheld when challenged
Supreme Court, they cannot
cannot be enforced. And that is where my other child of the
Civil War-a
War-a much more obscure offspring--comes
offspring--comes in.
The position of Solicitor General was created by Congress in 1870, shortly after
ratification
ratification of the Fifteenth
Fifteenth Amendment.22 It is without doubt an utterly unique
unique
institution. Perhaps nothing exemplifies
exemplifies this better than this anomaly:
anomaly: whereas
whereas many
many
lawyers consider being Solicitor General the greatest job one could ever
ever have (and
(and
they are right), the overwhelming
overwhelming majority of citizens has no idea what the Solicitor
Solicitor
General does-or even that the country
country has one.
The Solicitor General is, among other things, the United
United States's
States's lawyer
lawyer in the
Supreme Court, and for that reason he is often
often referred to as the "Tenth Justice."
Justice." The
The

Solicitor General
General of
of the
the United
United States.
States. This
This is
the text
of aa lecture
by the
** Solicitor
is the
text of
lecture sponsored
sponsored by
the
Law-Bloomington
Indiana Supreme Court and delivered at the Indiana University
University School
School of Law-Bloomington
3, 2000. The author expresses
on February 3,
expresses gratitude to Trevor W. Morrison for his
considerable assistance
Kiarman for
considerable
assistance in the preparation of the lecture and to Professor Michael
Michael Klarman
his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this lecture.
I. 5 U.S. (1
(1803).
1.
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
1870, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162. The Fifteenth Amendment was ratified
2. See Act ofJune 22, 1870,
ratified
in 1870. The Thirteenth and Fourteenth
1868,
Fourteenth Amendments were ratified in 1865
1865 and 1868,
respectively.
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"learned in the law,"
only officer of the United
United States required by statute
statute to be "learned
law,"33 he is
behalf of the United States in the lower
also responsible for supervising litigation on behalfofthe
extent
federal courts
courts and in the state courts. 44 What almost no one appreciates
appreciates is the extent
to which the position of Solicitor General has been linked with
with the national
knowledge that connection
imperative to foster equal rights. To my knowledge
connection has never been
subject to scholarly inquiry. It is what
what I want to explore with you today.
First, I want to issue a disclaimer. In my experience, there is nothing more
foolhardy or dangerous than a practicing lawyer venturing
of
venturing into the discipline
discipline of
history. Yet that is precisely
what
I
am
going
to
do.
And thus, to use the vernacular
vernacular
precisely
of the entertainment
entertainment industry, listeners are strongly cautioned.
Caution is particularly appropriate because what I will be attempting
attempting to set out
out
today are little more than propositions
propositions I am exploring. The invitation to deliver this
lecture provided me both an opportunity
opportunity and an incentive to develop what is at this
early stage a thesis. I know my thesis is defensible;
defensible; but it will take a lot more
more work
to know if it is in fact correct. This lecture
lecture represents a commencement, in the true
sense of the word.
proposition that probably
This lecture also proceeds
proceeds from at least
least one proposition
probably can never be
conclusively proved or disproved.
disproved. That is the notion that litigating lawyers in general,
general,
and the Solicitor General
General in particular, can and do affect the direction ofthe law. One
can never know precisely why the Supreme
Supreme Court decided
decided a particular
particular case the way
it did, and chose
chose the words it did to express that decision. But as Solicitor General,
General,
do-proceed with the conviction
I must-and do-proceed
conviction that the positions we take before the
play a role in the Court's decisionmaking. Similarly
Similarly
Court, and the way we take them, playa
General's
today, my analysis of the relationship
relationship between the work of the Solicitor General's
assumption that the
Office and the development of civil rights law proceeds from the assumption
participating in landmark
choices made by my predecessor
predecessor Solicitors
Solicitors General while participating
civil rights cases had some impact on the outcomes of those cases.
cases.
Let me tell you how I plan to organize
organize the balance of the hour. By my reckoning,
civil rights law in this country
country has largely
largely developed
developed in two distinct epochs:
epochs: the first
Ferguson;' the second was
began with the Civil War and ended
ended with Plessy v. Ferguson;s
6
launched
launched by the Second
Second World War. 6 I plan to examine the relationship between the

3.
28 U.S.C. § 505 (1994).
(1994).
3.28
4. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.20 (1999).
(1999).
5. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
5.
(1896).
6. I am not at all certain
certain how, or whether, to fix an end date for what I am calling this
"second epoch."
epoch." Persuasive
points can
support of
that itit closed
"second
Persuasive points
can be
be made
made in
in support
of contentions
contentions that
closed with
the passing of the Warren Court, or the Burger
Court,
or
even
that
it
continues,
in some
Burger
manifestations, to this day. Only
Only the passage of
of time
time will show
show which, if any, of those
periodizations
periodizations is appropriate. For now, we remain, in Bruce Ackerman's metaphor, too close
to the
the mountains
describe their
comprehensive way:
to
mountains to
to describe
their outline
outline in
in any
any comprehensive
Think of the American Republic as a railroad
railroad train, with the judges sitting in the
caboose, looking backward. What they see are the mountains and valleys of our
constitutional experience ....
....
As the train moves forward in history, it
dualistic constitutional
is harder for the judges to see the traces of volcanic ash that marked each
each
mountain's emergence
different
emergence onto the legal landscape. At the same time, a different
perspective
perspective becomes available:
available: As the more recent eruptions move further into
the background,
background, it becomes easier to see that there is now a mountain range out
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developmentof
ofcivil
civilrights
rights doctrine
doctrine and
andthe
thework
work of
ofthe
the Solicitor
SolicitorGeneral
Generalby
by looking
looking
development
attwo
Solicitors General
General from
from each
each period:
period: for
forthe
the first epoch,
epoch, Benjamin
Benjamin Bristow
Bristowand
and
at
two Solicitors
Samuel Phillips,
Phillips, the
the country's
country's first
first two
two Solicitors
Solicitors General;
General; for the
the second,
second, Philip
Philip
Samuel
and Archibald Cox, who
Perlman, who
who served
served from
from 1947
1947 through
through 1952,
1952,andArchibaldCox,
whowas
was Solicitor
Solicitor
Perlman,
General from 1961
1961 through
through 1965.
1965.
General

********
First, let
let me
me provide
provide some
some background.
background. When
When the
the First
First Congress
Congress met
met in
in 1789,
1789, it
First,
created the
the position
position of Attorney
Attorney General
General and
and vested
vested it with
with responsibility
responsibility "to
"to
created
prosecute and
and conduct
conduct all suits
suits in the
the Supreme
Supreme Court
Court in which
which the
the United
United States
States shall
shall
prosecute
be concerned,
concerned, and to
to give
give his advice
advice and
and opinion
opinion upon
upon questions
questions of law
law when
be
President of the United
United States,
States, or
or when
when requested
requested by
by the heads
heads of any
any
required by the President
required
7 Congress provided the Attorney
the departments."
departments."7
General neither
neither a department
department
Congress provided the Attorney General
of the
nor even a part-time
part-time clerk.
clerk. He
He had no
no formal
formal authority
authority over
over the United
United States
States
nor
Attorneys created
created for each
each federal district. That
That anomaly
anomaly caused
caused Edmund
Edmund Randolph,
Randolph,
Attorneys
the first Attorney
Attorney General,
General, to lament
lament that
that because of the want
want of
of a fixed relation
relation
the
attorneys of the districts
districts and the Attorney General,
General,
between the attorneys
the United
United States
States may
may be
be deeply
deeply affected by various
various proceedings
proceedings in
in the inferior
inferior
the
no appeal
appeal can
can rectify. The peculiar
peculiar duty of
of the Attorney General
courts, which no
best exertions
exertions can
can not be
be
upon him to watch over these cases;...
cases; ... [but] his best
calls upon
8
too often repeated, to oppose
oppose the danger of
of a schism. 8

Randolph therefore
therefore requested
requested authority
authority over the United
United States
States Attorneys. But
But his
Randolph
request, and similar
similar ones made by every President and Attorney
Attorney General
General until the
the
the Republic, the Attorney General
early decades
decades of
ofthe
Civil War, was refused. In the early
was, quite literally, alone.9

there that can be described in a comprehensive
comprehensive way.
Bruce Ackerman, Constitutional
YALE L.J. 453, 546 (1989).
Policy/ConstitutionalLaw, 99 YALELJ.
ConstitutionalPolicy/Constitutional
7. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 93.
93.
8. Letter from Edmund Randolph,
General, to George
George Washington, U.S.
Randolph, Attorney General,
(Misc.) 46 (1834).
1E PAPERS (MISC.)
STATE
AMERICAN STA
reprintedin 11AMERICAN
1791), reprinted
President (Dec. 26, 1791),
9. Over the years Congress gradually
gradually granted the Attorney General both some measure
supporting personnel
federal government and some supporting
of
of the federal
ofcontrol over the litigating efforts ofthe
of that objective. But such provisions came slowly. Indeed, it was
to aid in
in the achievement
achievement ofthat
permanent
clerk and permanent
not until 1818
gave the Attorney General aa single clerk
Congress first gave
1818 that Congress
1818, ch. 87, §§6, 3 Stat. 445, 447. And it was not until 1861
office
office space. See Act of Apr. 20, 1818,
federal district attorneys across the
that the Attorney General
General was given control over the federal
&CARL
12 Stat. 285, 285-286; HOMER CUMMINGS &
1861, ch.
ch. 37, 12
country. See Act of Aug. 2, 1861,
FEDERAL
AND THE FEDERAL
THE HISTORY OF JUSTICE AND
McFARLAND,
JUSTICE: CHAPTERS IN 1HE
MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE:
in
officers in
principal officers
the antebellum
antebellum period, principal
throughout the
EXECUTIVE 142,
(1937). But throughout
218, 491
491 (1937).
142, 218,
their
concerning their
other
the authority
authority to direct litigation concerning
other federal
federal departments retained the
the powerto
power to direct
General. That authority included the
the Attorney General.
ofthe
independent of
departments, independent
departments,
authority.
any comparable authority.
General had
had any
Attorney General
the work of district
long before the Attorney
district attorneys, long
It Should
Should Be": The
See Seth
United States
States As It
the United
Case of the
"Presentingthe Case
Seth P. Waxman, "Presenting
3, 7.
CT. HIST.
HIST. SOC'Y
SOC'Y 3,7.
Sup. CT.
Context, 1998
1998 J.J. SUP.
HistoricalContext,
Solicitor
Generalin
in Historical
SolicitorGeneral
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By the advent of the
the Civil War, litigation
litigation on behalf of
of the
the United States was
By
hopelessly confused. Much of it was conducted, even in the Supreme Court, by
private attorneys retained for individual cases. These attorneys-many
attorneys-many of whom were
private
simply
political
favorites-made
ill-considered
and
inconsistent
representations about
simply
representations
the position of the
the United States with respect to interpretations oflaw.
of law. And when the
of litigation, the system simply collapsed. The Senate
Civil War created an avalanche oflitigation,
passed aa resolution
resolution asking Henry
passed
Henry Stanbery, President Johnson's Attorney General,
General, for
his advice on how to fix it.
it.'"IO Stanbery asked for two things: the creation of a
his
Department of Justice that would encompass
encompass all of the law officers
Department
officers of the United
United
Attorney General
General would head; and the creation of a new
States, and which the Attorney
States." The latter would be
position, to be called Solicitor General of the United StatesY
responsible, in Stanbery's words, for "the
"the preparation
responsible,
preparation and argument of cases before
the Supreme
Supreme Court ...
...and the preparation of opinions on questions of
law referred
the
oflaw
to [the
[the Attorney
Attorney General]."12
General]. '"' The new Solicitor General would thus perform the
to
precise duties the First Congress had given the Attorney General.
Congress granted both of
ofStanbery's
Congress
Stanbery' s wishes. As to the position of Solicitor General,
General,
though, Congress had something
accompanying the
though,
something additional in mind. As the report accompanying
1870 Act stated:
We
create...
new officer,
be called
solicitor general of the
We propose
propose to
to create
... aa new
officer, to
to be
called the solicitor
United States,
States, part
whose duty
duty it
it shall be to try...
United
part of whose
try ... cases [on behalf of the
United States]
whatever courts
courts they may arise. We propose to have a man of
United
States] in whatever
of
sufficient learning,
ability, and
that he can be sent to New Orleans or
sufficient
learning, ability,
ana experience
experience that
or
to New
New York,
or into
any court
wherever the
Government has any interest
in
to
York, or
into any
court wherever
the Government
interest in
litigation, and
and there
there present
the case
case of the United
United States as it should be
litigation,
present the
be
presented.
presented.313
Now obviously
no individual,
"learned," could represent the United
Now
obviously no
individual, no matter how "learned,"
United
States in the Supreme Court, deliver
legal
opinions
deliver legal opinions for the President, serve
serve as a
second-in-command
second-in-command to the Attorney
Attorney General, and
and travel
travel around
around the country trying
trying
important cases. Any Solicitor
Solicitor General
General would need to prioritize. And Congress
Congress and
President Grant had in mind what
what that priority should
should be. It
It was reflected
reflected
unambiguously in the selection of the first two Solicitors General, men who occupied
unambiguously
occupied
the position
the
position for its first fourteen years.

********
Benjamin
Benjamin Helm
Helm Bristow, the first Solicitor
Solicitor General,
General, was a renowned
renowned lawyer, a loyal
4
Republican,
defender of black
Republican, and
and an
an ardent
ardent defender
black civil rights. 14 For
For the four years
immediately
Solicitor General,
immediately preceding
preceding his
his appointment
appointment as
as Solicitor
General, he served
served as
as United
United

10.
10. See
See CONG.
CONGo GLOBE,
GLOBE, 40th
40th Cong.,
Cong., 2d
2d Sess. 196 (1867);
(1867); CUMMINGS
CUMMINGS &McFARLAND,
&McFARLAND, supra

note
note 9,
9, at
at 222.
222.
11.
Doc. No.
See S.
S. ExEc.
EXEC. Doc.
No. 40-13,
40-13, at
at 22 (1867).
(1867).
11. See
12.Id.
12.Id.
13.
13. CONG.
CONGo GLOBE,
GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d
2d Sess. 3035
3035 (1870).
(1870).
14.
POLITICIAN 50-70
14. See
See Ross A.
A. WEBB,
WEBB, BENJAMIN
BENJAMIN HELM
HELM BRISTOW:
BRISTOW: BORDER
BORDER STATE POLmCIAN
50-70
(1969).
(1969).
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he distinguished
distinguished himself
himself as
as one
one
States Attorney
Attorney in Kentucky,
Kentucky, and during
during that tenure
tenure he
States
of the
the most aggressive
aggressive and
and successful
successful prosecutors
prosecutors of Ku Klux
Klux Klan cases in
in the
the
of
country. When
When Bristow
Bristow resigned
resigned his
his position
position as U.S.
U.S. Attorney,
Attorney, newspapers
newspapers as
as far
country.
5
away as New
New York
York hailed
hailed him
him as a "civil
"civil rights
rights champion."'
champion."ls
away
That is
is precisely
precisely what
what Congress
Congress and
and the
the President
President wanted.
wanted. They
They wanted
wanted the Civil
Civil
That
War Amendments
Amendments and the
the legislation
legislation implementing
implementing those
those Amendments
Amendments enforced,
enforced,
War
particularly in the South;
South; and they wanted
wanted an expansive
expansive interpretation
interpretation of
of these laws
laws
particularly
I
see
it, is how
That,
defended
in
the
courts,
particularly
in
the
Supreme
Court.
as
see
how the
Supreme
courts, particularly
defended in
civil rights mandate
mandate of the Solicitor General
General was set in train.
train.
Violence against
No one thought this mandate would be easy, and it was not. Violence
against
southern blacks, frequently
frequently perpetrated
perpetrated by
by members
members of the Ku Klux Klan, was
was on the
rise. In some southern
southern states,
states, egregious
egregious attacks
attacks were
were going
going unremedied
unremedied by local
local law
enforcement.
so-called "Black
"Black Codes,"
Codes," which,
enforcement. And several southern states had passed so-called
in the
the very
very face
face of the Thirteenth
Thirteenth Amendment,
Amendment, reinstated
reinstated a race-based
race-based caste system,
system,
keeping
blacks
as
an
inferior
and
dependent
class
disabling
them
them
from
owning,
by
inferior
dependent
keeping blacks
renting, or
or transferring
transferring property,
property, pursuing
pursuing skilled
skilled callings,
callings, or seeking
seeking access to courts.
enforced through
This great State
State of Indiana had in its constitution-and
through
constitution-and enforced
legislation-an
"[n]o Negro or Mulatto shall come into or settle
legislation-an article providing that "[n]o
in the State"
State" and further
further providing
providing that "[a]ll
any Negro or
or
"[a]ll contracts made with any
Mulatto coming
coming into
into the State ...
shall be void; and any person
person who shall employ
employ
...shall
such Negro
Negro or Mulatto, or otherwise
otherwise encourage
encourage him to remain in the State
State shall
shall be
fined."16
fined."' 6
1866,'1 the Enforcement
Civil Rights Act of 1866,17
Enforcement
responded by enacting the Civil
Congress responded
20
1875.20
1, 9 and
Act of1870,l8
1871,19
and the Civil Rights
Rights Act of 1875.
of 1870,'1 the Ku Klux Klan Act of 187
When Congress passed
passed the 1866 Act, the Fourteenth
Fourteenth Amendment-which
Amendment-which is the focus
regarding Congress's power
power to legislate
legislate over civil
civil
contemporary discussions regarding
of most contemporary
rights-had not yet been ratified. Thus, Congress
Congress asserted power under the
power
Enforcement
Amendment, which grants Congress the power
Thirteenth Amendment,
Enforcement Clause of the Thirteenth
to enforce
enforce the prohibition on slavery by appropriate
appropriate legislation.
legislation. The 1866 Act granted
all citizens
citizens "the
"the same right..,
right ... to make and enforce contracts,
contracts, to sue, be parties, and
and
give evidence,
evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
infringement of those
declared the infringement
citizens."'" It declared
property
... as is enjoyed by white citizens."21
property...
rights under color of
oflaw
crime; it created
created a federal civil right of action
action
law to be a federal crime;
to vindicate
vindicate those rights; and it permitted
permitted the removal
removal of state actions where a party
claimed that the vindication of those rights was not possible in state court. The
claimed

15. Id.
Id at 70.
16. IND. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 1-2 (repealed) (invalidated as violating the federal
Ind. 299 (1866)); see also infra text accompanying note
Moody, 26 Ind.
Constitution
Constitution in Smith v. Moody,
24.
1981at42
Stat. 27 (codified as amended at
ch. 31,14
31, 14 Stat
9, 1866, ch.
Apr. 9,1866,
17. Act of Apr.
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981(1994)).
1982, 1987-1989 (1994)).
16 Stat.
31, 1870, ch. 114, 16
Stat 140 (repealed 1894).
18. Act of May 31,1870,
(1994)).
1985 (1994)).
at42
19. Act ofApr. 20,1871,
42 U.S.C. § 1985
Stat. 13 (current version at
20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat
CivilRights
unconstitutional in The Civil
(declared unconstitutionalin
114,18
1, 1875, ch.
ch. 114,
18 Stat. 335 (declared
Rights
20. Act ofMar. 1,
(1883)).
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)).
Cases,
1982
at 42 U.S.C.
U.S.C. § 1982
1, 14
14 Stat. at 27 (current version at
ch. 31,
31, §§ 1,
1866, ch.
Act of Apr. 9, 1866,
21. Act
(1994)).
(1994)).
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Enforcement Act,
Act, the Ku Klux Klan
Klan Act,
Act, and the 1875 Civil Rights Act built on the
Enforcement
and invoked the by-then-ratified
by-then-ratified Fourteenth Amendment as authority for
1866 Act, and
expanding federal criminal jurisdiction to cover racially motivated violence and
expanding
to vote.
general interference with national civil rights, like the right to
statutes and
and convincing
convincing federal courts
courts to sustain
sustain their
But enforcing those statutes
constitutionality was a tall order,
order, and it required aa Janus-like posture for the Solicitor
constitutionality
General-looking in one direction to the district courts for enforcement, and in the
General-looking
other to the Supreme Court for validation. On the enforcement
enforcement side, the prospects of
of
other
obtaining civil rights
rightsjury
remote.'22 And with
obtaining
jury verdicts in the Old Confederacy
Confederacy seemed remote.
challenges in the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General would be required
respect to challenges
conservative and inclined
to persuade an institution that by its very nature tends to be conservative
program that was, by its very nature,
toward incrementalism, to uphold aa legislative
legislative program
far-reaching, indeed revolutionary.
Overall, the Solicitors General fared much better with enforcement in the district
district
courts than they did with defense in the Supreme Court. Let me give you a few
examples. In United
United States
States v.
v. Rhodes,23
Rhodes, 3 Bristow, while U.S. Attorney, prosecuted
prosecuted
examples.
three white defendants under the 1866 Act for robbing
robbing a black family in Louisville.
Bristow premised federal jurisdiction on the theory that state authorities could not
prosecute the case
case since state law precluded blacks from testifying in cases in which
whites were parties. The defendants challenged
challenged the Civil Rights Act as an
an
unconstitutionally
to
jurisdiction over matters properly left to
unconstitutionally broad grant of federal jurisdiction
state criminal
Supreme Court Justice Swayne, sitting as a Circuit Justice, held
criminal law. Supreme
that
that the Act permissibly
permissibly granted federal jurisdiction
jurisdiction in the case
case (citing
(citing as authority
authority an
opinion
of
the
Supreme
Court
of
Indiana
that
had
invalidated
an
article
of
the Indiana
opinion ofthe
ofIndiana
invalidated
24
Constitution under the Thirteenth
Amendment
and
the
1866
In
Thirteenth Amendment
1866 Civil Rights Act).
Act).24
November 1869 Bristow
able
was
to
report
to
the
Attorney
Bristow
General that as a result
result
of the Rhodes decision, he had been able to '''proceed[]
"'proceed[] with
with the trials of a large
number
of
parties...
under
the
Civil
Rights
Act
and
a
number
of those tried have
number parties ...
Rights
and
have
25
been sentenced
sentenced and are
are now serving
serving their respective
respective terms."'
terms. "'25
But in
in the Supreme
Supreme Court
Court Bristow could not sustain his legal theory. In a case
case
called
& Kennardv.
Kennardv. United States,26 a racially
racially motivated
motivated murder
murder case Bristow
called Blyew &
had also
also personally
personally prosecuted,
prosecuted, the Supreme Court
Court overruled
overruled Justice Swayne's
Swayne's
interpretation
7-2 the Supreme
Act
of7-2
Supreme Court held that the 1866 Act
interpretation in Rhodes. By a vote of
did not permit federal courts to assert jurisdiction
jurisdiction over a criminal case,
case, even where
a state
state prosecution could
could not proceed because
because all of the witnesses
witnesses were black and
and

22.
22. The
The likelihood
likelihood of
ofjury
jury verdicts
verdicts in
in favor
favor of
of the
the government
government diminished
diminished even
even further
further
when
former
Confederates
were
allowed
back
on
federal
when former Confederates were allowed back on federal juries
juries in
in 1879.
1879. Before
Before that,
that, federal
federal
jurors
Union. This
jurors were
were required
required to
to swear
swear that
that they
they had
had always
always remained
remained loyal
loyal to
to the
the Union.
This
presumably
presumably disqualified
disqualified aa number
number of
of those
those prospective
prospective jurors who were most irrevocably
irrevocably
opposed
opposed to
to black
black civil
civil rights.
23.
27 F.
16,151).
23.27
F. Cas.
Cas. 785
785 (C.C.D.
(C.C.D. Ky.
Ky. 1866)
1866) (No.
(No. 16,151).
24. See Smith
v. Moody,
Smith v.
Moody, 26 Ind.
Ind. 299 (1866).
(1866).
25.
supra note
60 (alteration
25. WEBB,
WEBB, supra
note 14,
14, at
at 60
(alteration and
and omission
omission added)
added) (quoting
(quoting Letter
Letter from
from
Benjamin
Helm
Bristow,
Solicitor
E. Rockwood
Benjamin Helm Bristow, Solicitor General,
General, to
to E.
Rockwood Hoar,
Hoar, Attorney
Attorney General
General (Nov.
(Nov. 9,
9,
1869)).
1869)).
26.
80 U.S.
581, 595
26.80
U.S. 581,
595 (1872).
(1872). For
For aa discussion
discussion of
of Bristow's
Bristow's prosecution
prosecution of the
the case
case at
at the
trial
trial level,
level, see
see WEBB,
WEBB, supra
supra note
note 14,
14, at
at 58-60.
58-60.
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therefore unable
unable to testify
testify against
against aa white
white defendant
defendant under
under state
state evidentiary
evidentiary rules.
rules.2727
therefore
The phenomenon
phenomenon of
ofsuccess
success in
in enforcing
enforcing the
the civil
civil rights
rights acts
acts in
in the
the district
district courts,
courts,
The
28
followed by
by frustration
frustration in the
the Supreme
SupremeCourt,
Court, became
becameaa pattern.
pattern. In
InExparte
Ex parte Walton,
Waiton,28
followed
for example,
example, (later
(later characterized
characterized by
by a congressional
congressional committee
committee as
as "[tihe
"[t]he first
first
for
29
the
act")29
the United
United States
States
important trial
trial in
in the
the United
United States
States under
under the
the enforcement
enforcement act")
important
indicted twenty-eight
twenty-eightpersons
persons for
for killing
killing a black
black man
man in
in Mississippi.
Mis~issippi. The
The defendants
defendants
indicted
exceeded
Act
Enforcement
that
the
alleging
petitioned
for
a
writ
of
habeas
corpus,
alleging
that
the
Enforcement
Act
exceeded
corpus,
a writ of habeas
petitioned
General
Solicitor
When
Congress's
authority
under
the
Fourteenth
Amendment.
When
Solicitor
General
Amendment.
the
Fourteenth
under
Congress's authority
was
order
so
high
that
Bristow
arrived
in
Oxford
to
supervise
the
trial,
tensions
were
so
high
that
order
were
trial,
tensions
the
to
supervise
in
Oxford
arrived
Bristow
30
by
a
full
company
of
United
States
infantry
and
cavalry
brigade.
being
maintained
brigade."
a
cavalry
and
States
infantry
of
United
a
full
company
by
being maintained
The district court
court upheld
upheld the
the Enforcement
Enforcement Act
Act as
as aa valid
valid exercise
exercise of
of Congress's
Congress's
The
3
authority.31
when aa defendant
defendant in
in another
another Enforcement
Enforcement Act
Act case,
case, Exparte
Ex parte Greer,
Greer,
' And when
authority.
petitioned the Supreme
Supreme Court
Court for a writ
writ of habeas
habeas corpus
corpus to review
review the
the
petitioned
constitutionality of the
the Act,
Act, Chief
Chief Justice
Justice Chase
Chase dismissed
dismissed the petition
petition for lack of
of
constitutionality
jurisdiction.3232
jurisdiction.
For five years
years thereafter
thereafter the entire
entire Enforcement
Enforcement Act remained
remained in
in force-a
force-a critical
critical
For
incidence of racially
which vigorous
vigorous prosecution
prosecution reduced
reduced the incidence
racially
five years during which
motivated violence. 333 But in 1876 the
the Court struck
struck down
down portions of the Enforcement
Enforcement
motivated
344 and narrowly construed the constitutional
Reesel
guarantees
narrowly construed the constitutional guarantees
Act in United
UnitedStates v. Reese
3
protected by another
another provision
provision in UnitedStates
United States v. Cruikshanl
CruikshanJils-effectively
gutting
-effectively gutting
protected
prosecution efforts under the Act. Both
Both cases
cases were
were argued
argued for the
the government
government by
prosecution
1872.
Samuel Phillips, who succeeded
Bristow as Solicitor General
General in
in November
November 1872.
succeeded Bristow
Phillips came
came with a civil
civil rights pedigree. As a federal prosecutor
prosecutor in
Like Bristow, Phillips
overseen several
several important
important Klan
North Carolina, he had conducted and overseen
remarkable tenure as Solicitor General-he
General-he served for
prosecutions.3366 But Phillips'
Phillips' remarkable
prosecutions.
General-was marked
twelve years under six Attorneys
Attorneys General-was
marked by bitter
bitter defeats
defeats in the
twelve
Supreme Court in a host of civil rights cases.
Harris," both
United States v. Harris,38
and United
Cases"7 and
Most notable were the Civil Rights Casesl
decided in 1883. In the former, the Court
Court struck down the provision in the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 that prohibited racial discrimination in public accommodations,
accommodations,
Observing that the provision in
conveyances,
conveyances, and places of public entertainment. Observing

27. See Blyew, 80 U.S. at 595.
MCFARLAND, supra
& McFARLAND,
CUMMINGS &
supra note 9,
28. The case is unreported, but is discussed in CUMMINGS
(1901), and
MississiPPi 351-52
at 235-37, JAMES WILFORD GARNER, RECONSTRUCTION
RECONSTRUCTION IN MISSISSIPPI
351-52 (1901),
WEBB, supra
supranote 14, at 88.
(1872).
42-41, at 936 (1872).
S. REP. No. 42-41,
29. S.
29.
at 88.
88.
note 14,
14, at
supra note
at 352;
352; WEBB, supra
supranote 28, at
30.
30. See GARNER, supra
14, at
at 88.
supranote 14,
VEBB, supra
at 351-52; WEBB,
supra note 28, at
31.
GARNER, supra
31. See GARNER,
at 96-97.
96-97.
note 14,
14, at
supranote
32. See WEBB, supra
32.
33. See id.
id.
34.92
U.S. 214 (1876).
(1876).
34. 92 U.S.
35.92
(1876).
35. 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
Robert
22,27
(1904); Robert
J.L. 22,
FieldPhillips.
Phillips,LL.D., 1I N.C. lL.
SamuelField
Hon.Samuel
R.H. Battle, Hon.
36. See R.H.
36.
27 (1904);
REv.
HiST. REv.
Dissenter,58 N.C. HIST.
D. Miller, Samuel
Southern Dissenter,
The Odyssey ofa Southern
FieldPhillips:
Phillips:The
Samuel Field
263,275
(1981).
263, 275 (1981).
(1883).
37.
37. 109 U.S.
U.S. 33 (1883).
38.
(1883).
U.S. 629 (1883).
38. 106 U.S.
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question did "not profess to be corrective of any constitutional wrong committed by
the States," the Court held, 8-1,
8-1, that it exceeded Congress's power to enforce any
in Harris,
Harris,the
the Court
substantive provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.399 Similarly in
struck down §§ 2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871,
1871, which outlawed conspiracies to
to
deprive citizens of the equal protection of the laws. The Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court held, could not be violated by the conduct of private parties, no matter how
invidious their purpose or how egregious their acts.440" The Court allowed that racially
racially
motivated murder by a private party might violate the Thirteenth Amendment, but §§
2 of the Ku Klux Klan Act was not limited only to race and thus could not be upheld
on that theory either.
One explanation for the civil rights defeats that Phillips-and, before him,
Bristow-suffered
Bristow-suffered at the Court may be that by the time cases implicating
Reconstruction civil rights laws began reaching the Court with regularity in 1875 and
Reconstruction
later, much of the political ardor ofReconstruction
mid- 1870s,
Reconstruction had subsided.441 By the mid-1870s,
a nationwide recession had diverted national attention away from issues of race and
towards economic
economic matters.
matters. Then, in the 1874 national elections, Reconstruction
Reconstruction
towards
of
suffered a serious blow when Democrats
Democrats won back control
control of the House of
Representatives from Reconstructionist
Representatives
Reconstructionist Republicans. Those elections both severely
undermined congressional support for Reconstruction and reflected
reflected the shift in
national priorities
priorities away from civil rights issues. It is difficult to know how much that
shift affected the Court, and we will never know whether major civil rights cases like
Cruikshankand Reese would have come
differently had they been decided at the
Cruikshank
come out differently
height of Reconstructionist
Reconstructionist zeal in the early-1870s.
early-1870s. But it seems reasonable
reasonable to
mid- 1870s played at least some role
surmise that changes
changes in national
national priorities by the mid-1870s
in the defeats that Bristow and Phillips suffered at the Court.
Samuel Phillips's best-known
best-known civil rights argument
argument is one he made long after his
representing a black railroad
twelve-year tenure as Solicitor General.
General. In 1896, representing
42
passenger named Homer Plessy in the infamous
passengernamed
infamous case ofPlessyv.
of Plessyv. Ferguson,
Ferguson,42
Phillips
argued that a Louisiana statute requiring
requiring railroad
railroad companies
companies to provide
provide "equal
"equal but
but
separate accommodations
accommodations for the white and colored races"
separate
races" violated the Equal
43
Protection
The Court, we all know, held
held otherwise. The sole dissenter in
in
Protection Clause.43 The
both the Civil
Civil Rights Cases
Cases and Plessy
Plessyv.
former
both
v. Ferguson
Ferguson was Benjamin Bristow's former
law partner, Justice
Justice John
John Marshall
Marshall Harlan.'
Harlan.44
to an unmistakable
The Court's ruling in Plessybrought
broughtto
unmistakable end the country's first civil
civil
rights
era. Following the string of earlier
Congress's
rights era.
earlier losses in defense
defense of many of Congress's

39. The Civil Rights Cases,
Cases, 109 U.S. at
at 14.
14.
40. See Harris,
Harris, 106 U.S. at
at 643.
643.
41.
POLITICS OF JUDIcIAL
INTERPRETATION:
41. See generally
generally ROBERTJ.
ROBERT J. KACzoROWSKI,
KACZOROWSKI, THE
THEPoLmcs
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION:
THE
1866-1876 (1985).
THE FEDERAL
FEDERAL COURTS,
COURTS, DEPARTMENT
DEPARTMENT OF
OF JUSTICE,
JUSTICE, AND
AND CIVIL
CIVIL RIGHTS
RIGHTS 1866-1876
(1985).

42. 163
163 U.S.
U.S. 537 (1896).
(1896).
43.
Id. at 537 (quoting
111); see also Damon
43.Id.
(quoting 1890
1890 La.
La Acts 111);
Damon Keith,
Keith, One Hundred
Hundred Years
After
After Plessy v. Ferguson,
Ferguson, 65
65 U.
U. CN.
CIN. L. REV.
REv. 853,
853, 854-55 (1997)
(1997) (discussing
(discussing facts
facts and
and
procedural
procedural background
background of Plessy).
Plessy). Phillips shared the
the oral argument
argument on Plessy's behalf
behalf with
Albion Tourgee, who
who had
had represented
represented Plessy
Plessy since
since trial. See generally
generally CHARLES
CHARLES A. LOFGREN,
LOFGREN,
THE
THE PLESSY
PLESSY CASE:
CASE: A
A LEGAL-HISTORICAL
LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION
INTERPRETATION (1987).
(1987).

44.
44. Plessy,
Plessy, 163 U.S.
U.S. at 552
552 (Harlan, J.,
J., dissenting);
dissenting); The Civil Rights Cases,
Cases, 109
109 U.S. at33
at 33
(Harlan,
(Harlan, J.,
J., dissenting).
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statutes, P/essy's
Plessy's overwhelming
overwhelming rejection of what today seems
seems like a
civil rights statutes,
bedrock principle of equal protection left few options, 6and little enthusiasm for
5
happened.46
little happened.
years little
fifty years
For fifty
further legal challenges.4s For
further

********
And then another great war ended. Black soldiers returned home in 1945 with a
new perspective
perspective on their abilities and their treatment. President Truman appointed a
government to become active in
Committee on Civil Rights, which urged the federal governmentto
seeking an end to racial discrimination in all its forms.
forms."47 Truman publicly
publicly committed
that the federal government would be a "friendly
"friendly vigilant defender of the rights and
equalities of all Americans
Americans....
.... Our National Government," he said, "must show the
48
way.,,48
way.
But who was to lead? The Department of Justice had no Civil Rights Division,49
Division, 49
and generations
generations of federal prosecutors had come and gone with no experience
experience
whatsoever in civil rights prosecution.
prosecution. No significant national legislation had been
enacted
eviscerated many of the Reconstruction
Reconstruction
enacted since the Supreme
Supreme Court had eviscerated
provisions.
The mission fell to Solicitor General Philip Perlman
Perlman and his staff to devise a
strategy. In this new phase,
the
posture
of
the
United
States
phase,
posture
States was quite different.

45. Justice Harlan's dissent was prophetic
prophetic of Plessy's
Plessy's impact:
The present decision, it may well be apprehended, will not only stimulate
aggressions...
aggressions ... upon the admitted
admitted rights of colored citizens, but will encourage
encourage
the belief that it is possible, by means of state enactments,
beneficent
enactments, to defeat the beneficent
purposes
adopted
they adopted
purposes which the people of the United States had in view when they
the recent amendments
amendments of the Constitution,
Constitution, by one
one of which the blacks
blacks of this
country
United States and of
of the States in which
which they
countIy were
were made citizens of the United
respectively
respectively reside,
reside, and whose privileges
privileges and immunities, as citizens,
citizens, the states
states
are forbidden
forbidden to abridge.
Plessy,
at 560.
Plessy, 163 U.S. at
560. For a detailed
detailed analysis of the post-Plessy
post-Plessy period, and the
the
jurisprudential
Michael J. Klarman,
Klarman, The PlessyEra,
Plessy Era, 1998 SuP.
SUP. CT. REV.
REv.
jurisprudential tenorofthe
tenor ofthe times, see Michael
303.
46.
"little," of course, in a relative, not an absolute, sense. Prominent
of
46. II mean
mean "little,"
Prominent examples of
pro-civil rights
Court during this 50-year
50-year period
pro-civil
rights decisions
decisions by the Court
period include Smith v. Allwright,
AI/wright,
321 U.S.
649 (1944),
321
U.S. 649
(1944), and Missouri
Missouri ex rel.
rei. Gaines v. Canada,
Canada, 305 U.S. 337
337 (1938).
(1938). For a
pro-civil rights decisions during the second decade
decade of the twentieth
twentieth
contextual account
account of pro-civil
century, see Michael
in the Progressive
Klarman, Race andthe
and the Court
Courtin
Progressive Era,
Era, 51 V
VAND.
AND. L. REv.
REv.
Michael J. Klarman,
881 (1998).
881
(1998). See
See also
also Andrew
Andrew Kull, Post-Plessy,
Post-Plessy, Pre-Brown:
Pre-Brown: "Logical
"LogicalExactness
Exactness in Enforcing
Equal Rights", 1999
Soc'Y 155.
155.
1999 J. SUP.
SUP. CT. HIST.
RIST. SOC'y
47.
47. The
The Committee,
Committee, formed
formed by
by President
President Truman
Truman in December
December 1946,
1946, released
released its
its report in
October
October 1947. See PREsiDENr's
PREsIDENT'S CoMM.
COMM. ON CIvIL
CML RIGHTS,
RIGHTS, To SECURE
SECURE THESE
THEsE RIGHTS:
RIGHTS: THE
REPORT OF THE
TIlE PRESIDENT'S
PREsIDENT'S COMMrrrEE
COMMITTEE oN
ON CIVIL
CML RGHTs
RIGHTS (1947).
(1947).
48. Brief
Brief for the United
United States
States as Amicus
Amicus Curiae
Curiae at 2, Shelley
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
334 U.S. 1
(1948)
(1948) (No. 72).
49. A small
1939 by then-Attorney
then-Attorney General
General Frank
Frank
small civil
civil rights unit had been established
established in 1939
Murphy,
"[it] was still pretty much
much the
Murphy, but
but it was
was diminutive. As one historian
historian described
described it, "[it]
Tinker
Toy itit had been when
RICHARD KLUGER,
KLUGER, SIMPLE
SIMPLE JUSTICE 252
252
TinkerToy
when Frank Murphy
Murphy set
set it up."
up." RcHARD
(1977).
(1977).
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Litigation now came
came to the
the Supreme
Supreme Court
Court not
not in enforcement
enforcement suits brought
brought by
by the
Litigation
United States,
States, but
but in
in private
private litigation
litigation brought
brought by
by the likes
likes of Charles
Charles Hamilton
Hamilton
United
Houston, Thurgood
Thurgood Marshall,
Marshall, and the attorneys
attorneys of the NAACP.
NAACP. Those
Those attorneys
attorneys
Houston,
devised a litigation
litigation strategy
strategy much
much like that
that often
often employed
employed by
by Solicitors
Solicitors General
General in
in
devised
behalf of the United States-bringing
States-bringing to
to the Supreme
Supreme Court
Court
managing litigation
litigation on behalf
managing
an incremental
incremental progression,
progression, generating
generating momentum
momentum one
one small
small step at
at a time.5"so
cases in an
cases
United States was not a party
party in these cases.
cases. But there can
can be little
little doubt, in
The United
of utmost
utmost fragility
fragility in civil rights litigation,
litigation, that the
the cautious Supreme
Supreme
period of
this period
would attach great
great significance
significance to the position-if
position-if any-the
any-the Tenth Justice
Justice
Court would
Court
in a series
series of filings, the Solicitor
Solicitor General
General lent
lent unqualified
unqualified
might choose to take. And in
support to the plaintiffs.
support
5 was one of several cases involving constitutional
challenges
Kraeme,sl
constitutional challenges
was one several cases
Shelley v. Kraemer
by private
private parties to racially restrictive covenants
on real
real property.
property. Perlman filed a
covenants on
by
amicus curiae, urging
urging the
the Supreme
Supreme Court
Court to declare
declare that
that the Fourteenth
Fourteenth
brief amicus
Amendment
Amendment prohibits judicial
judicial enforcement
enforcement ofracially
racially restrictive covenants.
covenants. The brief
brief
longer
reminded the Court
Court that, although
although formal, de
de jure residential
residential segregation
segregation no
no longer
reminded
existed, "[a]ctual
"[a]ctual segregation,
segregation, rooted
rooted in ignorance,
ignorance, bigotry and prejudice, and
existed,
supposed
nurtured
nurtured by the opportunities
opportunities it affords for monetary
monetary gains from the supposed
beneficiaries and
and real victims alike, does exist because private racial restrictions
restrictions are
beneficiaries
52
COUrts."52
asserting a broad right to be
be free from raceraceenforced
In bold language asserting
enforced by courts."
based discrimination,
discrimination, the Solicitor
Solicitor General
General urged the 53
Court to prohibit judicial
based
did.53
Court did.
enforcement
restrictive covenants. And
And the
the Court
enforcement of restrictive
time the United States had
had gone on record in the Supreme
Supreme
Shelley was the first time
manifestations of racial
racial discrimination.
discrimination. Two years
condemning all manifestations
Court broadly condemning
Court in which
which the United States
States was a party-a
party-a
civil rights case came
came to the Court
later, a civil
announced that
party defendant. In an unusual
unusual and bold filing, the Solicitor
Solicitor General
General announced
that
judgment in favor of the United States, but instead would
would
he would not defend the judgment
54
Henderson v. United
plaintiff.54
argue in support of the civil rights plaintiff.
The case was Henderson

AGAINsT
50. See generally
generally MARK TUSHNET,
TusHNET, THE NAACP's
NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY
S1RATEGY AGAINST
Physics o/Persuasion:
ofPersuasion:Arguing the
P. Waxman,
Waxman, The Physics
(1987); Seth
Seth P.
EDUCATION (1987);
SEGREGATED EDUCATION
(forthcoming 2000).
New Deal,
Deal, 88 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming
51.
U.S. 1 (1948).
51. 334 U.S.
(1948).
(No. 72).
72).
121, Shelley (No.
52. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Curiae at 121,
53. There is an ironic footnote to this proud moment. The brief for the United States in
53.
Shelley was written by four Jewish lawyers named Philip Elman, Oscar Davis, Hilbert Zarky,
brief.
the filed brief.
and Stanley Silverberg. Their names, however, were deliberately
deliberately omitted from the
Solicitor General's
Mr. Elman, Arnold Raum, the Solicitor
subsequent account by Mr.
General's
According to a subsequent
enough that
that Perlman's
Perlman's
"bad enough
principal assistant (and himself a Jew) told the others that it was "bad
four more
more Jewish
Jewish
name has to be there, to have one Jew's name on it, but you have also put four
put
of Justice
Justice put
names on. That makes it look as if a bunch of Jewish lawyers in the Department of
JusticeFrankfurter,
Office, Justice
SolicitorGeneral's
General'sOffice,
this out."
Frankfurter,
&Norman Silber, The Solicitor
out." Philip Elman &
REV. 817, 819 (1987).
OralHistory,
History,100 HARV. L. REv.
and
946- J960: An Oral
Rights Litigation,
Litigation,J1946-1960:
andCivil
CivilRights
General's
54. It is unusual, although consistent with the finest traditions of the Solicitor General's
lower-court judgment
Supreme Court a lower-court
office, for the United States to decline to defend in the Supreme
in favor of ,the United States when the Solicitor General concludes
concludes that the lower-court
generally
"confessing error." See generally
judgment cannot be defended. The practice is known as "confessing
(1963).
221,224-25
BAR REC. 221,
Court,55 CHI. BARREc.
Archibald Cox, The Government
224-25 (1963).
in the
the Supreme Court,
Government in
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States,5 and here is what happened.
States,ss
train's
Elmer Henderson, a black passenger on a train, was declined service in the train's
reserved for blacks were partially
dining car because the tables conditionally reserved
occupied by whites when he arrived in the dining car. The dining car steward refused
those tables, even
even though they had empty seats.
seats. Henderson filed
filed
to seat Henderson at those
the Interstate
Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC"). During the litigation,
a complaint with the
separate table surrounded
surrounded by a partition would
the railroad changed
changed its rules so that a separate
passengers. But that still left the question of whether
whether
always be reserved for black passengers.
segregation was itself permissible. Henderson maintained that it was not, and
such segregation
contended specifically that it violated the Interstate Commerce
Commerce Act. The ICC rejected
rejected
his claim on the ground that the provision of separate but equal facilities was not
discrimination. Henderson appealed to a three-judge district court, naming both the
United States and the ICC as defendants. The Justice Department
Department defended the ICC's
ICC's
decision, the district court agreed, and Henderson
Supreme
Henderson appealed directly to the Supreme
Court.
Consistent with his now-public stand against racial discrimination, Perlman refused
to defend
defend the district court's judgment
judgment and switched sides in the case. The brief filed
on behalf
behalf of the United States contended that segregation on trains violated the
Interstate
Commerce Act. But Perlman
Interstate Commerce
Perlman did not stop there. He also argued that the
doctrine
of"separate
itself unconstitutional, and thatPlessy
that Pess should be
doctrine of"separate but equal" was itselfunconstitutional,
56
overruled.
overruled. s6 Never before
before had the United States called
called for the overruling of Plessy,
and to fully appreciate
appreciate the significance of this step it is necessary to understand how
very rarely
Supreme Court to overrule
rarely the Solicitor General ever asks the Supreme
overrule one of its
s7
precedents."
But
in
Henderson,
the
Solicitor
General
left
no
room
for doubt. As
precedents.
Henderson,
Philip Elman, then an attorney
in
the
Solicitor
General's
Office, later described
described the
attorney
brief, it "took
equality were mutually
"took a flat, all-out position that segregation and equality
mutually
6
inconsistent, that separate
contradiction in terms.""
separate but equal was a contradiction
terms."SB
The Supreme
Supreme Court was not prepared
prepared to take such a bold step. It found for
Henderson
without
reaching
the
constitutional
Henderson
reaching
constitutional question. But even though the Court

Between
time the Solicitor General filed the
brief in Shelley and the
Between the time
the United
United States's
States's amicus briefin
date on which
which he announced
Hendersonv. United
announced that the United States
States would switch
switch sides in Henderson
States, 339
816 (1950),
separate occasions
States,
339 U.S.
U.S. 816
(1950), Perlman
Perlman on five separate
occasions asked
asked the Supreme
Supreme Court to
vacate lower-court decisions
decisions in civil rights cases in which the United States, as a defendant,
had
review he
concluded the lower courts had been
on review
he concluded
been wrong
wrong to rule against
against
had prevailed,
prevailed, because
because on
the civil
civil rights plaintiffs.
55. Henderson,
55.
Henderson, 339 U.S. 816.
816.
56. See
56.
See Brief for the United
United States
States at 12,
12, 23-66,
23-66, Henderson
Henderson (No. 25).
25).
57.
TENTH JUSTICE
57. See,
See, e.g.,
e.g., LINCOLN
LINCOLN CAPLAN,
CAPLAN, THE
THE TENm
JUSTICE 107 (1987)
(1987) (quoting Rex
Rex Lee,
Solicitor
saying that itit "'accomplishes
"'accomplishes
Solicitor General
General during President
President Reagan's
Reagan's first term, as saying
nothing"'
nothing'" to
to "'lecture
"'lecture the Justices about
about where
where they
they went wrong'
wrong'" and to urge
urge them to overturn
overturn
well-established
well-established precedent);
precedent); Craig R. Callen,
Callen, Stare
Stare Decisis
Decisis and the Case for
for Executive
Restraint,
also infra
infratext accompanying
MISS. C. L. Rsy.
REv. 79,
79, 90-95, 97-99 (1988);
(1988); see also
accompanying notes
notes
Restraint, 99 Miss.
83-84, 88.
83-84,88.
58.
58. Elman & Silber, supra
supra note 53,
53, at 821.
821. Elman
Elman himself played a crucial
crucial role
role in
in the
the
development
development and articulation
articulation ofthe
ofthe United
United States's position in Henderson.
Henderson. For abrief
a brief account
account
of
that role,
ofthat
role, see
see Anthony
Anthony Lewis,
Lewis, "Imposing
"Imposing on
on Them
Them a
a Badge
Badge ofInferiority",
ofInferiority ", N.Y.TIMEs,
TIMES, Jan.
22,
2000, at
Al5.
atAl5.
22,2000,
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did not reach Plessy
Plessy in Henderson,
Henderson, it seems reasonable to surmise that the Solicitor
Solicitor
General's
General's willingness to do so made an impression
impression with the COurt.
Court.599
succession of all-important
all-important
That impression was of the utmost importance
importance in the succession
school desegregation
desegregation cases Thurgood
Thurgood Marshall had lined up for the Court. On the
casessame day the Court announced
announced its decision in Henderson,
Henderson, it decided two cases60 and
Painter6°
and McLaurin
McLaurin v. Oklahoma616 -involving
-involving racial segregation in
Sweatt v. Painter
universities. Again, the Solicitor
Solicitor General
General filed amicus briefs
briefs in both cases urging the
Court to overrule
state-sponsored racial segregation
segregation is
overrule Plessy and declare that state-sponsored
62
unconstitutional in all cases.62
Again the Court ruled on narrow
narrow grounds.
grounds. This time, it did reach the Constitution:
it found equal
equal protection violations in both Sweatt and McLaurin,
McLaurin, but it did so by
focusing on the inferiority of the education black students had received in both cases,
63
blacks' educational opportunities were
not on the fact ofsegregation
ofsegregation itself.
itself.63 Because blacks'
not equal to those of whites, the Court emphasized
emphasized that the cases did not require
require any
reconsideration of whether "separate
"separate but equal"
reconsideration
equal" was itself a valid doctrine.'
doctrine. 64
Plessy forever. In its landmark
landmark 1954 decision
But the Court could not avoid Plessy
decision in
6
Board of Education,
" a unanimous
Brown v. Board
Education,65
unanimous Court held that state-mandated
state-mandated
segregation in public education is unconstitutional, without regard to the relative
segregation
quality of the educational
educational opportunities
opportunities available to either race.
A full discussion of Brown, and the roles of all the major players in the case,
particularly the legendary efforts oflawyers
of lawyers at the NAACP, is beyond the scope of
particularly
of
this lecture. I would like to focus your attention, however, on one part of the Brown
Brown
decision, a part in which the Solicitor General played a key role. That was the Court's
Court's
decree
eliminated not immediately, but "with all
decree that de jure school segregation be eliminated
deliberate
controversy
deliberate speed."
speed." Even today, the Court's choice of that locution
locution stirs controversy
and debate.
The actual parties in the Brown litigation
litigation presented the Court
Court with a stark choice:
"separate but equal" or end school segregation
either uphold "separate
segregation virtually immediately.
Brown
Were those truly the Court's only options, there is reason to doubt whether Brown
would have come out quite as it did. An order compelling
compelling immediate desegregation
desegregation
almost certainly
certainly could
could not have commanded
commanded unanimous support on the Court, and
and
order
many on the Court may well have worried that attempts at executing such an order
disobedience and violence.
might have been met with widespread
widespread civil disobedience

59. 1I do not mean to suggest that the Court invariably
government
invariably lagged behind
behind the federal government
evidenced aa
on matters of civil rights during this period. In at least a few instances, the Court evidenced
progressive attitude towards civil rights before the United
progressive
United States government did. In Smith v.
Allwright,
(1944), for example, the Court invalidated the exclusion of blacks
AI/wright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944),
from aa primary
primary election in Texas. The Roosevelt
administration, however, elected not to
from
Roosevelt administration,
participate in the case, possibly for fear of offending
Democrats in Congress.
offending southern Democrats
Congress.
60. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
(1950).
60.339
61. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
(1950).
61.
62. See Brief for the United States at 9-14, Sweatt (No. 44); Memorandum
Memorandum for the United
States as Amicus
McLaurin (No. 34).
Amicus Curiae at 9-14, McLaurin
McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 640-41; Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 632-33.
63. McLaurin,
632-33.
64. See Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 635-36.
65. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
65.347
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Speaking
Speaking as an amicus curiae supporting
supporting the plaintiffs,
plaintiffs, the Solicitor General
General
proposed
segregation to be unconstitutional,
proposed a third option: hold segregation
unconstitutional, but allow school
desegregation.'66 As Philip Elman
districts some leeway
leeway in the implementation
implementation of desegregation.
"offered the Court a way out of its dilemma,
described it, this option "offered
dilemma, a way to end
end
racial segregation
disobedience, a way to decide the
segregation without
without inviting massive disobedience,
'6 7
constitutional issue
issue unanimously
unanimously without tearing
tearing the Court apart."
apart."67
By balancing its
principled
segregation with aapragmatic
principled opposition to segregation
pragmatic view of
ofwhat
what sorts ofarguments
were
were actually viable to the Justices, the Solicitor General
General helped the Court to arrive
at a decision
that
was
both
forceful
in
principle
and
workable, even ifneither side was
decision
both
principle
fully satisfied.
The United States's position in Brown reflected
reflected an important aspect
Solicitor
aspect of the Solicitor
General's unique role with respect
respect to the Supreme
Supreme Court. In our constitutional
constitutional system,
respect
law are of surpassing importance, and adherence
adherence
respect for precedent
precedent and the rule of
oflaw
to those principles makes the Supreme
Supreme Court an inherently cautious institution. The
The
United
United States as a litigant benefits
benefits from, and shares, the Court's institutional
institutional
adherence to doctrines of stability in the law. And for that reason,
reason, the Court has come
to rely on the Solicitor General to present
present briefs of the most scrupulous fidelity, and
to combine statements of principle
principle with strategies by which the Court may rule in a
manner
General's
manner most consistent
consistent with principles
principles of stability. Thus, the Solicitor General's
position in Brown combined
combined an unambiguous,
unambiguous, principled
principled insistence
insistence on an end to
"separate but
but equal"
equal" with
with aa suggestion
suggestion for
for aa mechanism
mechanism by
"separate
by which the Court
Court could
importance with a minimum of
of
abandon stare decisis in a matter of critical societal importance
upheaval
upheaval and risk to the Court's
Court's institutional
institutional authority.
The suggestion of "all
"all deliberate
deliberate speed" has been criticized
criticized as both without legal
post-Brown era.668
"
foundation and responsible for a great
great deal of foot-dragging in the post-Brown
There is some force to both of those points. But it also seems clear that the Court
so
could not have resolved Brown as it did-and certainly could not have done so
unanimously-without
"all deliberate speed."
speed." Although
unanimously-without the cushion of "aU
Although both sides in
the case opposed it, "all
"all deliberate speed"
speed" proved to be the ground on which all
members of the Court felt they could stand together.

********
pragmatism and a
The approach manifested
manifested in Brown-tempering
Brown-tempering principle with pragmatism
respect
ofthe
strategy in the next
respect for precedent-was
precedent-was the very hallmark of
the government's
government's strategy

66. The actual phrase "deliberate
"deliberate speed"
speed" did not appear in the United States's initial brief.
According to Elman,
Elman, that phrase
its first
first appearance
in Brown in
in [Assistant
[Assistant Attorney
"made its
appearance in
Attorney
According
phrase "made
General J. Lee]
Lee] Rankin's
oral argument
argument in 1953."
1953." Elman
Elman &
Silber, supra
supra note 53, at 830; see
Rankin's oral
& Silber,
General
49A LANDMARK
AND ARGUMENTS OF TIlE
THE SUPREME
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
49A
LANDMARK BRIEFS
BRIEFS AND
SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL
538 (Philip B. Kurland &
& Gerhard Casper eds., 1975); MARK V. TUSHNET,
TUSHNET, MAKING
MAKING CIVIL
CIVIL
RIGHTS LAw
RIGHTS
LAW 208 (1994).
(1994).
67. Elman
Elman &
& Silber, supra
supra note 53,
53, at 827.
68. See id.
id at 827-28 (describing
of a delayed
delayed remedy for
for aa constitutional
(describing the idea
ideaofa
constitutional violation
violation
as "entirely
"entirely unprincipled
... just plain wrong
wrong as
as aamatter
of constitutional
constitutional law");
law"); Randall
matter of
as
unprincipled [and] ...
Kennedy, A Reply to Philip
REV. 1938, 1947 (1987)
(1987) (noting that "a
Philip Elman, 100 HARV.
HARv. L. REv.
Kennedy,
decade after
after Brown, only
only 2.3
2.3 percent
black schoolchildren
schoolchildren in
in the
the south
south were
decade
percent of black
were attending
attending
desegregated schools").
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phase of civil rights litigation.
litigation. Archibald
Archibald Cox was John F. Kennedy's Solicitor
Solicitor
General. A Harvard law professor with expertise in labor
labor law and government
government
experience during the Truman administration,
experience
administration, Cox enjoyed
enjoyed a storied tenure
tenure as
69
Many of his important victories came in civil rights cases.
Solicitor General.69
cases.
When Cox assumed office, several different types ofcivil rights cases
cases were making
making
their way to the Supreme Court. Some
Some school cases still remained
remained in the aftermath of
of
Brown. A newer group of cases included prosecutions of African-American
Brown.
African-American sit-in
demonstrators for refusing to leave
demonstrators
leave whites-only public
public facilities. Other
Other cases
concerned the reapportionment
electoral districts
discrimination in
concerned
reapportionment of electoral
districts and racial discrimination
voting procedures.
procedures.
Archibald Cox was a cautious litigator by nature, and his views about the
appropriate posture for the Solicitor General with respect to positions taken
appropriate
taken before
the Court was similarly conservative.
conservative. As a result, in several civil rights cases,
cases, he
he
disagreement with Attorney General
found himself
himself in tactical disagreement
General Robert F. Kennedy.
Kennedy envisioned
envisioned the Department
Department of Justice championing
championing a broad vision of the
Reconstruction Amendments
discrimination
Reconstruction
Amendments as prohibiting
prohibiting all forms of race-based
race-based discrimination
and as authorizing Congress to pass legislation concerning even purely private
70
Court's
conduct.70 Cox was more circumspect. He was mindful of the Supreme
Supreme Court's
opinion in the Civil Rights Cases
Cases and skeptical that the Court would agree that the
Fourteenth Amendment
Amendment authorized Congress to reach purely
purely private conduct,
however
however discriminatory.
discriminatory.
Moreover, Cox thought it inappropriate for the Solicitor General
General to be pressing
pressing
expansive
arguments before the Court. He knew that the
expansive and doctrinally
doctrinally tenuous arguments
the
views of the Solicitor
considerable weight with the Court, and he felt
Solicitor General carried considerable
felt
he had a duty (as Robert Kennedy
Cox'ss view) '''to
"'to protect
Kennedy once described Cox'
protect the Court
from itself'''
itself'" when it came to delicate questions of constitutional
constitutional rights. 771'
.
72 is prime
City of
Columbia72
Bouie v. City
ofColumbia
a
example of Cox's approach. Bouie was one
one
of a series of cases arising out of
ofthe
convictions of
ofblack
the convictions
black protestors for violating
violating state
trespass laws by staging sit-ins at whites-only lunch counters. In the Supreme
Supreme Court,
the protestors argued
argued that the States had enforced their trespass statutes in a racially
discriminatory
discriminatory manner, and they urged the Court to find that such discrimination
discrimination
violated the Equal Protection
'
Protection Clause.773
Many
Many in the Department of Justice
Justice wanted the United
United States, as amicus
amicus curiae, to
74
take a similar position.74
And after all, that was not much of a step beyond
beyond Shelley v.
7
Kraemer,
" decided in 1886, which held that raciaIIy
racially
Kraemer, or indeed Yick
Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
Hopkins,7s
discriminatory enforcement
of
a
facially
neutral rule violates the Fourteenth
enforcement
Fourteenth

69. For general accounts of Cox's tenure as Solicitor
Solicitor General, see CAPLAN,
CAPLAN, supra
supranote 57,
at 188-201,
188-201, and KEN GORMLEY, ARCHIBALD
ARCHIBALD COX:
CONSCIENCE OF A
Cox: CONSCIENCE
A NATION 140-96 (1997).
(1997).
S.NAVASKY,
NAVAsKY, KENNEDy
KENNEDY
70. See GORMLEY, supra
supra note 69, at 164, 172, 177, 189; VICTOR S.
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER,
SCHLESINGER, JR.,
JUSTICE 289-95 (1971);
(1971); ARTHUR
JR., ROBERT
ROBERT KENNEDY AND HIS TIMES
(1978).
290-91 (1978).
71.
71. GORMILEY,
GORMLEY, supra
supra note 69, at 172 (quoting
(quoting Interview by Anthony Lewis with Robert
1964)).
F. Kennedy
Kennedy and Burke Marshall (Dec.
(Dec. 12,
12, 1964».
72. 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
(1964).
73. See Brief for Petitioners
Petitioners at 19-59, Bouie (No. 10).
74. See GORmLEY,
supra note 69, at 155-59.
GORMLEY, supra
75. 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
(1886).
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Amendment. But Cox chose a much
much more narrow ground. Rather
Rather than invoking
sweeping equal
equal protection principles, he focused the Court's attention on statutory
statutory
contended that the South Carolina trespass
interpretation. Cox contended
trespass statute could
could not fairly
proscribe the conduct of the protestors. And even if the statute was
be read to proscribe
susceptible of such a reading,
susceptible
reading, he argued, the defendants
defendants in Bouie certainly
certainly did not
not
76
76
have fair warning that the statute would be so construed.
construed.
To me, that position seems rather far-fetched, since an obvious objective of the
plaintiffs'
demonstration had been to get arrested.
arrested.'77 But the Supreme
plaintiffs' demonstration
Supreme Court accepted
accepted
Cox's invitation to rule narrowly.
narrowly.788 The South Carolina courts were free to construe
the trespass statute to cover
cover a protestor's refusal to leave a lunch counter, it held, but
but
because
of
because such a reading
reading was an unforeseeable
unforeseeable expansion
expansion of the previous meaning of
9
79
Bouie."
the statute,
statute, it could not be applied
applied against the defendants in Bouie.
The next Term, Cox again adopted a cautious
cautious approach, this time in two landmark
1964-the first significant civil
cases involving challenges
challenges to the Civil Rights Act of 1964-the
rights legislation since the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was struck down in the Civil
Cases. The cases were Heart
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
United States
States80° and
and
Rights Cases.
881
Katzenbach
Katzenbach v. McClung.
McClung.

25-55, Boule
10). The
76. See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae at 25-55,
Bouie (No. 10).
protestors themselves also made a similar
similar argument as an alternative basis for reversal, see
Brief
for Petitioners
Brieffor
Petitioners at 59-65,
59-65, Boute
Bouie (No.
(No.110),
0), but their focus was on the equal protection issue.
77. See Bouie, 378 U.S.
U.S. at 367 n.4 (Black, J.,
J.,
dissenting) (noting that
that"[o]ne
"[o]ne petitioner said
that he had intended to be arrested; the other said he had the same purpose 'if
'if it took that."').
that. ",).
78. Before
Before it did so, however, the Court invited the Solicitor
Solicitor General to file a supplemental
supplemental
brief
"expressing the views of the United States upon 'the
'the broader constitutional
constitutional issues which
brief"expressing
for the United States as Amicus Curiae
have been mooted.'
mooted'" in the case. Supplemental Brief
Brieffor
U.S. 347 (Nos. 6, 9, 10, 12,
12, &
& 60). In its supplemental
supplemental brief the United
at 1-2, Bouie, 378 U.S.
States took the position that discriminatory
discriminatory enforcement
enforcement of trespass laws does constitute
constitute an
Civil Rights Cases,
Cases,
equal protection
protection violation.
violation. The brief accepted
accepted the Court's decision
decision in the Civil
but argued that Bouie and the cases with which it was consolidated were distinguishable
distinguishable
andjudicial
judicial enforcement of state laws
because they involved state action in the form of police and
idat 10, 16-17.
16-17. Thus, Cox was willing to make the equal
in a discriminatory
discriminatory fashion. See id.
protection argument if pressed. Presumably,
Presumably, he simply judged the more narrow argument to
be preferable
preferable as a strategic
strategic matter.
be
79. Bouie, 378 U.S.
U.S. at 363. In part because the protestors intended
intended and expected
expected to be
"unforseeability" rationale
arrested, the Court's "unforseeability"
mtionaIe seems rather
mther tenuous at best. Indeed, even at
the time Boute
rationale. See, e.g., Monmd
Monrad
Bouie was decided, commentators
commentators were skeptical of that mtionale.
G.Paulsen,
Cases of 1964:
None",
SUP. Cr. REV.
G.
Paulsen, The Sit-In Cases
I 964: "But Answer Came There None
", 1964 SUP.
REv.
137, 141 ("The majority's
137,
majority's position respecting due process
process requirements in interpreting
interpreting criminal
of its
statutes has established
established a precedent
precedent that will be difficult to follow because of the breadth ofits
effect....
ratiodecidendi
decidendi
effect. ... It is not to be expected
expected that the Court will be diligent in applying the ratio
of Bouie to other cases."). But the Court's willingness to base its decision on that rationale
rationale
underscores
means
underscores its desire to avoid reaching the equal protection issue, even if doing so means
jeopardizing
jeopardizing doctrinal credibility. See Michael
Michael J.
J. Klarman, An Interpretive
Interpretive History
History ofModern
ofModern
Equal
Protection,90 MICH. L.
L.REV.
REv. 213,274
213, 274 (1991)
(1991 ) (contendingthat
(contending that in Bouie and other sit-in
Equal Protection,
cases, "the
clever/disingenuous strategies for reversing the
"the Court employed a variety
variety of clever/disingenuous
convictions" without reaching
demonstrators convictions"
reaching the equal protection
protection issue).
80.
379 U.S.
U.S. 241 (1964).
80.379
(1964).
81. 379 U.S.
U.S. 294 (1964).
(1964).
81.
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"public accommodations"
At issue was the 1964 Act's "public
accommodations" section, which prohibited
prohibited
" For the United
United
discrimination in restaurants,
restaurants, motels, movie theaters, and the like.882
States, the question was whether to defend the provision under the Fourteenth
Fourteenth
Amendment, or under the Commerce
Commerce Clause, or under both. The Attorney General,
General,
many leading
leading civil rights lawyers and constitutional
constitutional scholars,
scholars, and even reportedly the
83 The underlying
President, preferred
preferred the Fourteenth
Fourteenth Amendment.83
underlying aims of the Civil
Rights Act, after all, sound more in equal protection than interstate commerce,
commerce, and
appropriate choice.
so the Fourteenth
Fourteenth Amendment seemed a more
more appropriate
Cox disagreed. In his view, the Court could accept the Fourteenth
Amendment
Fourteenth Amendment
argument only if it were prepared
argument
prepared to overrule its decision
decision in the Civil Rights Cases.
Cases.
"public accommodations"
accommodations" section of the Act was directed specifically
The "public
specifically at private
action, and the Court had held in the Civil Rights Cases
Casesthat Congress could
could not reach
purely private discrimination under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Fourteenth Amendment.
Amendment. Not
overruling the Civil Rights Cases
only did a decision overruling
Cases seem unlikely to Cox,"
COX,84 but his
his
regard for stare decisis made him uncomfortable
uncomfortable at the prospect of mounting an
8s
argument
argument that conflicted directly with an eighty-year-old
eighty-year-old precedent.85
In contrast, Cox considered the Commerce
Commerce Clause argument
argument to be "as
"as easy as
rolling off a log.,,86
log."86 A former labor law professor, Cox knew that during the New Deal
Solicitor General Stanley Reed had used a succession of NLRB cases
cases to coax the
Supreme Court into a remarkable
remarkable expansion of Congress's Commerce Clause
Clause
authority.87 And since in passing the Civil Rights Act Congress
Congress had determined
determined that
that
authority.87

82. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994).
(1994).
83.
e.g., GORMLEY,
GORMLEY, supra
83. See, e.g.,
supra note 69, at 189.
84. Cox may also have had in mind a case decided just before he became Solicitor General.
General.
InBoyntonv.
Virginia,364
364 U.S.
U.S. 454 (1960),
(1960), decidedjust
decidedjust aamonth after
after PresidentKennedy
Boynton v. Virginia,
President Kennedy was
In
elected, the
the Supreme
elected,
Supreme Court had seemingly
seemingly gone out of its way to avoid having to address the
question whether
question
whether private conduct could violate the Fourteenth
Fourteenth Amendment. In that case, a
black law
student named
convicted of
ofunlawfully
in the
the whiteswhitesblack
law student
named Bruce
Bruce Boynton was convicted
unlawfully remaining
remaining in
only section of a bus terminal
terminal restaurant in Richmond, Virginia. His petition for certiorari
challenged his conviction both as an invalid burden on interstate commerce, in violation of the
Commerce Clause,
Clause, and
and as
as contrary
contrary to the Due
Due Process
Process and
and Equal Protection
Protection Clauses
of the
Clauses of
Commerce
the
Fourteenth Amendment. In a brief
brief filed by Solicitor General J. Lee Rankin in support of
of
Amendment is violated
Boynton, the United States argued that the Fourteenth
Fourteenth Amendment
violated when generally
applicable state laws are applied to effectuate
effectuate the racially discriminatory practices of private
entities. See
See Briefforthe
Brief for the United
States as
as Amicus Curiae
at 16-28,
16-28, Boynton
Boynton (No.7).
(No. 7). In making
United States
Curiae at
entities.
that argument,
argument, Rankin
Rankin stopped
stopped short of asking the Court to overrule the Civil Rights Cases,
Cases,
that
noting that "there
"there the Court carefully
carefully reserved the question whether the [Fourteenth]
Amendment secured
secured the
the right
be free
state-sanctioned discrimination
discrimination in places of
of
free from state-sanctioned
Amendment
right to
to be
public accommodations."
accommodations." Id.
in original).
original). The Court, however, was unwilling
public
Id. at 21 (emphasis
(emphasis in
to thread that needle. Instead, it took the unusual step of reversing the judgment of the court
of appeals on aground
a ground wholly separate from the questions raised in Boynton's petition. Rather
Rather
than reaching the constitutional issues, the Court held that Boynton's convictions
convictions violated
violated the
Interstate
Commerce Act.
Act. Considering
therefore, Cox may
may have believed
believed that the
Boynton, therefore,
Interstate Commerce
Considering Boynton,
Court would
would be
be reluctant even to engage,
engage, much
much less
less overrule,
Civil Rights Cases
Cases in Heart
overrule, the Civil
Heart
ofAtlanta
McClung.
of
Atlanta Motel and McClung.
85. See GORMLEY, supra
supra note 69, at 189.
86.
Id.
86.Id.
87. See Waxman,
Waxman, supra
supra note 50.
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motels, restaurants, and other public
accommodation establishments
establishments "affected"
public accommodation
"affected"
interstate
determination
interstate commerce,
commerce, Cox believed the Court
Court would have to accept that determination
unless it could conclude that Congress had acted irrationally.
irrationally.
He was, of course,
course, right. Relying
Relying on the Commerce Clause, the Court unanimously
upheld the 1964
1964 Civil Rights
Rights Act in both cases. Two members ofthe Court-Justices
Douglas and GoldbergGoldberg- wrote separately
separately to indicate that they would also uphold
uphold the
Act under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Fourteenth Amendment.888 But with respect
respect to the Court
as a whole,just
whole, just as in the sit-in cases, Cox's strategy was effective
effective in achieving the
desired result without
requiring
the
Court
to
revisit
entrenched
precedent
without
precedent or create
create
wholly new areas ofjurisprudence.
of jurisprudence. Cox was, in that sense, a successful
successful civil rights
advocate during a period in which
advocate
which the Court might not have been as willing as many
in the Department
elsewhere to redefine the foundations of civil rights
Department of Justice and elsewhere
law.

********
There is much more to tell, but I will not try your patience
patience for much longer. Let me
make a few remarks consolidating
consolidating what I have tried to say about the four men I have
covered.
First, I do not mean to leave the impression either that promotion of civil rights
doctrine was the principal reason the position of Solicitor General
General was created, or that
Solicitors
expense of other
Solicitors General have pursued civil rights objectives at the expense
overarching imperative
imperative for creating the office, and the mandate
responsibilities. The overarching
Solicitors General
under which Solicitors
General have acted ever since, focused on the need to vest in
one position the responsibility for ascertaining,
ascertaining, and promoting, the interests of the
regardless of subject matter. At the same
United States with respect to all litigation, regardless
same
time, though, it would be a mistake
mistake to overlook
overlook the undeniable
undeniable civil rights subtext for
creation of the office, the consequent special responsibility many Solicitors General
have felt for civil rights litigation,
litigation, and the contribution
contribution they have made to the
development of this unique
development
unique area of law.
interesting-and it may even be useful-to contemplate
contemplate the similarities
similarities and
and
It is interesting-and
differences among the strategies of the Solicitors General I have discussed. The role
differences
played by Bristow and Phillips was unique to the period. Their
Their impact in quelling
enforcement was significant, but riding circuit and
persistent violence by vigorous enforcement
overseeing criminal
overseeing
criminal prosecutions in the district courts has long since passed from the
Solicitors' General repertoire.
Solicitors'
repertoire. Also entirely unique was the opportunity Bristow and
Amendments and the
Phillips had to write
write on a truly clean slate. The Civil War Amendments
Reconstruction civil rights legislation were all new. They fundamentally
fundamentally altered the
Reconstruction
relationship between the national government
government and the states. Then-unlike
now-stare decisis was simply not a major consideration.
consideration.
Why Bristow and Phillips
Phillips were so notably unsuccessful in the Supreme
Supreme Court is a
question that calls out for research.
research. An advocate
advocate with the orientation of Archibald
Archibald
creative
Cox might question whether the approach
approach his early progenitors
progenitors took-using
took-using creative
arguments in support of broad readings-presented
arguments
readings-presented a bridge that was simply too long

88. See
See Heart of
of Atlanta
241, 279 (1964)
88.
Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,
(1964) (Douglas, J.,
concurring); id.
id. at 291 (Goldberg,
(Goldberg, J., concurring).

HeinOnline -- 75 Ind. L.J. 1313 2000

1314
1314

LA WJOURNVAL
INDIANA LAW
JOURNAL

[Vol. 75:1297

cautious jurists to cross. And yet Bristow and Phillips did not have
and uncertain
uncertain for cautious
the luxury Cox enjoyed-surveying
enjoyed-surveying 100
100 years of precedent to determine what might
and might not work.
benefit of hindsight; and yet he pursued a litigation
litigation
Philip Perlman did have the benefit
strategy quite reminiscent
reminiscent of the one Bristow and Phillips had followed-this time
with great success. The position staked out by the United
United States in Shelley,
Henderson,and the early school desegregation cases was broad and uncompromising.
Henderson,
The Court did not go as far, as fast, as the Solicitor
Solicitor General advocated, but it seems
reasonable
States-particularly the
reasonable to conclude that the arguments of the United States-particularly
equal protection
protection and the outright call for
unequivocal embrace of a broad theory of equal
the overruling
overruling of Plessy-had
considerable influence, coming as they did from an
Plessy-had considerable
office that is itself institutionally committed to the principle of stare decisis.
Archibald
caution in his case was rewarded
rewarded with an
Archibald Cox was quite different, and caution
enviable record of success. Cox's approach
approach was grounded in pragmatism,
pragmatism, but it also
reflected something more. Like
Like many other Solicitors General,
General,899 Cox had a strong
strong
General's special obligation
obligation to safeguard
reverence for stare decisis and the Solicitor General's
the institutional
institutional integrity of the Court. And Cox's approach
approach in civil rights litigation
litigation
continuation of the posture adopted by the United States in
was a lineal continuation
Brown-pointing
Brown-pointing the Court at a momentous
momentous juncture
juncture toward an approach that would
permit all members of the Court to articulate with one voice a result the nation would
respect.
Cox's decision to ground the United States'
States' defense of the 1964
1964 Civil Rights Act
Commerce Clause
"what ifs."
on the Commerce
Clause alone has left standing a quiet chorus of "what
ifs." By the
time the United
Heart of Atlanta Motel and Katzenbach
United States filed its briefs in Heart
Katzenbach v.
McClung, President Kennedy had been assassinated
McClung,
assassinated and his brother was distraught
and preoccupied. But what might have happened if their
their strategic preference
preference had
prevailed and the United
United States had sought
sought to uphold the Act under the Fourteenth
Amendment?
Amendment?
We can glimpse at a tantalizing
tantalizing hint by looking at a case that was before
before the Court
the very next Term. United
United States v. Guest'
involved
a
civil
Gues~ involved
rights prosecution of
of
private individuals for conspiracy
conspiracy to deprive black citizens of their rights to equal
enjoyment
States-written by the new
enjoyment of public facilities. The brief for the United States-written
Solicitor General, Thurgood Marshall-argued
without
hesitation
Marshall-argued
hesitation that Congress,
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Fourteenth Amendment, may proscribe wholly private
conduct
private conduct
aimed at denying persons equal enjoyment of public facilities.991' Six members of the
the
Court agreed, and wrote separate
separate opinions to express the view that Congress may,
under its Section
enjoyment
under
Section 5 authority, reach wholly private conduct
conduct to deny equal enjoyment
of
"interfere with
with the exercise
exercise of Fourteenth
of state
state facilities
facilities or
or otherwise
otherwise to "interfere
Fourteenth

89.
think particularly
particularly of
of Rex
Rex Lee,
Lee, aa highly regarded
Solicitor Geneml
General who
who served during
89. 1I think
regarded Solicitor
during
President Reagan's
Reagan's first
CAPLAN, supra
supra note
57, at
at 107,
107, 144-46;
144-46; Rex
Rex E.
E. Lee,
President
first term.
term. See
See CAPLAN,
note 57,
Lee,
Lawyeringforthe
the Government:
Politics,Polemics
Polemics&
&Principle,
595, 600-01
600-01
Lawyering/or
Government: Politics.
Principle, 47
47 OHIO
Omo ST.
ST. L.J.
L.J. 595,
(1986).
(1986).
90.
383 U.S.
(1966).
90.383
U.S. 745 (1966).
91.
See Brief
Brief for
for the
the United
States at 18-52,
18-52, Guest
Guest (No.
(No. 65).
65).
91. See
United States
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93 and three
'9 2 But three
Amendment rights."
rights.,,92
these Justices
Justices were
were in the
the majority,
majority,93
and three
But three of these
Amendment
and the opinion
opinion for the
the Court
Court found it unnecessary
unnecessary to decide
decide the
were in the
the dissent, 94 and
were
question.99S5
question.
Itmay
may well
well be
be that even
even if Cox hadmade
had made the
the Fourteenth
Fourteenth Amendment
Amendment argument
argument in
Heart of
ofAtlanta
Atlanta Motel
Motel and McClung,
McClung, the
the Court
Court would
would have
have rejected
rejected it, or found itit
Heart
unnecessary to
to reach
reach that
that ground
ground of
of decision.
decision. But
But especially
especially in light
light of
of the current
current
unnecessary
Congress's authority
authority under
under both the
Court's efforts
efforts to delineate
delineate the
the limits of Congress's
Court's
Commerce Clause
Clause and
and Section
Section 55 in civil
civil rights
rights cases, questions
.questions like these
these are
are
Commerce
interesting to contemplate.
conte.mplate. I hope
hope you will.
interesting

J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
(Brennan, 1.,
Guest, 383 U.S. at 782 (Brennan,
92. Guest,
93. See id.
Justices Black and Fortasjoined Justice Clark's
Clark's
id.at 761 (Clark, J., concurring). Justices
opinion.
94. See id.
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Chief Justice
id. at 774 (Brennan,
Warren and Justice Douglas joined Justice Brennan's opinion.
95. The opinion of the Court, written by Justice Stewart, construed the indictment at issue
action. See id.
id at 753-57. In that way, it avoided the question
actual state action.
case to allege actual
in that case
absence of state action.
whether the Fourteenth Amendment
Amendment might be violated in the absence
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